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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO SCHOOL OF LAW 
FOURTH ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY CHAIR 
OCTOBER 25, 2012 
 
The Nature of the Law and the Role of Citizenship 
 
Remarks of Robert John Araujo, S.J.* 
First of all, I want to thank you for being here tonight to join with me 
in thinking about something that has been important to me for almost 
half a century (and I am sure to most of you)—the law.  One 
fundamental question about the law concerns a core issue: what is its 
essence?  In short, what is it about?  By tackling in this brief hour this 
subject, I am hopeful that these thoughts will spur your own reflections 
on the law and why it is vital to us and to our society.  The points I shall 
make to you may be placed into two complementary categories: the first 
deals with the essence of the law itself, i.e., what is it that makes the law 
the law; the second concern deals with the role of the citizen—as law-
maker, administrator, judge, other official, or voter—in defining what 
the law is and what its content should be.  At the outset, these two 
groups are inextricably related to the vitality of our republican 
democracy. 
From my perspective, I know that these two interrelated topics 
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Institute; B.C.L., Oxford University; J.D., Georgetown University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia 
University.  Upon completing military service as an officer in the United States Army, Father 
Araujo served as a trial attorney and attorney advisor in the Solicitor’s Office of the United States 
Department of the Interior (1974–1979).  In 1979, he joined the Law Department of the Standard 
Oil Company (Ohio) and served in a variety of capacities until 1985.  After corporate service, he 
joined the general corporate department of a New England law firm and remained there until 
providing counsel on issues dealing with public international law.  He was also a member of the 
law faculty at Gonzaga University from 1994 to 2005 and became the Robert Bellarmine, S.J., 
University Professor in American and Public International law.  He then became Ordinary 
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deserve a treatment far more profound than can be offered in today’s 
presentation. But in this hour, I hope to specify and briefly develop 
several elements that are needed for the task of responsibly addressing 
the two categories which I have just identified.  Let me begin by 
tackling the law’s essence.  What is it?  How do we begin? 
 
I. 
From an historic perspective we can think of some of the earliest 
legal systems that dealt with the regulation of human conduct from the 
ancient Jewish law that derived from the Mosaic law; the law of 
Hammurabi; the legal systems of ancient Greece and Rome; and, the 
law of the Church.  As we think of these ancient systems of codified 
principles and how they were applied to the lives of those who lived in 
the legal systems supported by these laws, we should see that there is 
something common that underpins each of them.  What is this common 
denominator?  As a teacher of the law and as a former practitioner of the 
law, I have been working on an understanding of this theme for some 
time.  As a result of my ongoing reflection, I have concluded that there 
is a purpose or an objective that appears to be at the heart of the matter 
of why we have law and the juridical institutions that participate in its 
existence.  While I agree with Professor Michael Olivas that we 
teachers of the law are also “in want of a purpose,”1 much of what he 
said when addressing the topic dealt with the preservation of the 
profession of teaching the law.  While I have some sympathy with this 
enterprise, I must also be candid and assert that there is something 
more, there has to be something more to the teaching of the law because 
there is something more to the law than the preservation of the 
profession that teaches it and the profession which practices it. 
And what the “it” is is the subject of this lecture.  Regardless of who 
we are as individuals, each of us has a sense of the law and what it is 
about.  For those who have businesses that are regulated by the state and 
its legal institutions, their livelihoods are intersected by the law.  For 
those who earn income, their revenue is regulated by the law.  For most 
who want to do something in the public square—from speech, to 
publication, to operating a motor vehicle—their lives and the law are 
inseparable.  But if the law is seemingly inescapable from human 
existence, what can be said about its essence, its nature?  Does it have 
something to do with logic, or to borrow from the famous line of Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, does it have something to do with experience rather 
 
1. Michael A. Olivas, Ask Not For Whom the Law School Bell Tolls, 41 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 101, 101 (2013). 
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than logic?2  In an important way, it deals with both.  Allow me to 
explain my position. 
Since the beginning of human history, the making and application of 
law has been a part of civilization.  Typically as we think about the 
history of the law—law designed to protect the citizenry and the 
society—we see two things that precede the law’s drafting and 
promulgation.  The first item is, when all of the jokes about law are put 
aside (for example, the line misattributed to Bismarck that laws are like 
sausage, it is better not to see them being made),3 we ascertain that the 
law begins with the activity of human intelligence.  In candor, while 
each of us may have differing opinions about the merits of what the 
thinker is thinking and what is the measure of intelligence behind the 
thinking, we need to acknowledge that the human intellect is at work as 
laws are formulated.  The second element follows, but it is trickier to 
evaluate: this human intelligence has the capacity to comprehend the 
intelligible world or universe that surrounds us.  But what does the 
intelligence comprehend, and how is the object of the comprehension 
being registered?  For the time being, we can see that there is something 
about the law that makes it a synthesis of this intelligence 
comprehending the intelligible reality: the human mind acknowledges 
the need for authoritative normative direction that responds to some 
matter of concern to society.  This is what is or should be at the heart of 
the law-making enterprise.  But we are still not at the essence or nature 
of the law itself.  More work is in order. 
Of course, we should recognize that the measure of intelligence and 
its effectiveness in comprehending what is needed by the way of law to 
respond to the needs of society is not always the same for everyone.  
Something is still missing as we consider the possibility that some laws 
which are the product of a great deal of thought have problematic if not 
evil consequences.  For example, we may recall the Fugitive Slave Law 
or the Nuremburg Laws.4  There is no doubt that much thought went 
 
2. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881) 
(“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
3. See Peter L. Strauss, The Courts & The Congress: Should Judges Disdain Political 
History?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 242, 265 n.92 (1998) (noting that regardless of whether Bismarck 
made this statement, many agree to its message). 
4. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (including the return of escaped slaves as a component of 
entitling citizens of each state to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states); 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (repealed 1864) (mandating that states return 
escaped slaves and imposing criminal sanctions for individuals who helped slaves escape); INGO 
MÜLLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 96–111 (Deborah L. Schneider 
trans., 1991) (describing the theoretical underpinnings for and the process of creating the 
Nuremberg Laws). 
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into their design.  As we think about such problematic or evil laws, we 
can identify the need for the law-making process to take account of the 
moral implications of the law that will be produced.  Human 
intelligence and its perception of the moral concerns of society are 
essential to the law-making enterprise and to the law itself.  The same 
human intelligence, which has a crucial role in the making and 
interpretation of the law, has the capacity to recognize that the law is 
more than just a way of making and applying laws—norms—to many 
aspects of human existence.  It is more than a system of achieving 
certain political results.  It is a system that is integral to human society, 
which often goes by the name of the rule of law and is dedicated to 
achieving the common good.  We know the rule of law as the norms and 
the system of governance including the making, interpretation, and 
application of the norms by which we live in civil society.  But the 
theme of today’s presentation is to obtain a better understanding of what 
is the law itself, that is, its nature/essence.  Hence, there is need to take 
into consideration its moral dimension.  After all, the result and impact 
of the law will tell us a great deal about its nature. 
This issue raises the question that has intrigued the members of the 
human family since ancient times: this issue is the quiddity, or the 
“whatness” of the law.  In a more contemporary way, we can think of 
quiddity (whatness) as addressed by a series of questions such as: what 
is the law about; what is it supposed to do; and why do we need it? 
In offering an initial response to these and related questions, we 
might think of Thomas Aquinas’s first principle of the law which takes 
into consideration moral concerns: do that which is good and avoid that 
which is evil.5  The Swiss Jesuit theologian Viktor Cathrein (1845–
1931) offered a similar insight when he stated that the law is “the light 
of reason inherent in us by nature, through which we perceive what we 
ought to do and avoid.”6  Saint Paul of Tarsus presented another useful 
formulation by acknowledging that the fundamental quality of the law is 
that which God has inscribed on our hearts.7  In relying on the work of 
John Courtney Murray, my take about what is at the heart of the making 
of norms, which are the laws for society, is this: the law is premised on 
the two assumptions that I have already mentioned, viz., (1) the human 
person is intelligent, and (2) human intelligence is capable of 
 
5. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, at pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 1952), reprinted in 20 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD 1, 221–22 (Robert M. Hutchins et al. eds, 1952). 
6. HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 181–82 (Thomas R. Hanley trans., 1949) 
[hereinafter ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW]. 
7. Romans 2:15. 
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comprehending intelligible reality so that the governance of society by 
the rule of law proceeds in a rational, moral, and just fashion.8  And 
now I have added a third area for consideration: the moral factor or 
dimension. 
It is necessary to evaluate what I have presented so far.  Knowing that 
I have begun, but not completed a process of explaining the nature of 
the law, we must consider whether the essence of the law is a command; 
is it a suggestion; is it a grant of something to someone; or, is it 
something else?  Is it an obligation, duty, or responsibility?  Is it a right 
to be claimed by one and satisfied by another?  Is it the mechanism for 
attaining whatever is good and avoiding whatever is evil? 
One way of sorting out answers to these questions is by returning to 
the emphasis I just placed on the synthesis of the intellect 
comprehending the intelligible reality given the context of the common 
good and the accompanying moral evaluation.  We probably agree that 
the human person is an intelligent creature.  Notwithstanding different 
measures of how this intelligence is distributed and exercised, we 
probably also agree that each person is gifted with a degree of reason.  
Notwithstanding the subjectivity that can compromise human reason, it 
also remains within the capacity of the human person to think and 
comprehend beyond one’s self to understand the subject matter that is 
the focus of the reason in an objective manner.  In short, what I am 
suggesting here is that the individual person has the capacity in 
reasoning to understand the matter from the perspectives of others as 
well as the perspective of one’s self.  This is the fundamental aspect of 
the moral question—the distinction between good and evil—to which I 
have alluded.  Moreover, this is the basis for contending that the human 
person is intelligent and has the capacity for thinking and acting 
objectively, i.e., beyond self-interest, in order to achieve what is good 
and right and to avoid what is not. 
With this objective intelligence at work, the human mind has the 
aptitude to comprehend the events and needs of the world that 
necessitate the making and application of norms that promote human 
flourishing and the common good.  By the common good, I mean this: it 
is the achieving and preservation of the good for the individual and the 
good for of all members of the same society.  The good for anyone 
cannot be considered without simultaneously considering the good for 
 
8. See JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS 
ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 109 (1960) (describing the presupposition of the doctrine of 
natural law as: “[T]hat man is intelligent; that reality is intelligible; and that reality, as grasped by 
intelligence, imposes on the will the obligation that it be obeyed in its demands for action or 
abstention”). 
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others.  The norms necessary for advancing the common good are the 
basis of the positive human law that are essential to any society so that 
the common good may always be the objective of the law.  Why?  The 
answer is uncomplicated: the law serves all rather than some members 
of society.  Certainly there are corruptions of legal systems where the 
common good is not the goal of the law, its making, or its application 
and adjudication.  But objective intelligence sways the law-maker from 
this tragic result which is contrary to the law’s nature. 
An illustration of a corrupt legal system is the totalitarian state whose 
values are typically characterized by furthering the interests of the 
ruling party rather than the common good.9  It is emblematic that in the 
totalitarian legal system the will (the desire) outstrips or outpaces the 
crucial role of the unbiased intellect as I have described it.  Although 
the will is a vital part of human nature (most people have goals and 
desires), it must nonetheless be tempered by the intellect, which is 
guided by objective reason.  If it is not, the will can generate an appetite 
that is destructive to the person whose will is the directing force and to 
those who are affected by this will’s exercise. 
A will that is guided by the discerning and objective intellect is 
needed to direct both the person and society toward goals that are both 
useful and essential to achieving the common good.  By way of 
example, the Preamble of the United States Constitution offers a critical 
perspective into the will desiring the common good by asserting as 
objectives: the forming a more perfect union, the establishing justice, 
the insuring domestic tranquility, the providing for the common 
defense, the promoting the general welfare, and the securing the 
blessings of generations for the existing as well as future generations.10  
These aspirations are attainable when the law that is the product of the 
Constitution is guided by objective reason.  I hasten to add here that the 
Preamble to the basic law of the United States reflects inspiring 
objectives that are applicable beyond the shores of the land where this 
law was intended to apply. 
But now we must contend with the question, where does the objective 
reason come into play?  We begin by looking at something foundational 
to the Constitution, viz., the Declaration of Independence.  In this 
document we see objective reason in operation.  Its foundation is a 
 
9. See J. L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY 43–49 (1970) (noting 
how members of the controlling party that “claim to know and to represent the real and ultimate 
will of the nation . . .  [have] a blank [check] to act on behalf of the people, without reference to 
the people’s actual will”). 
10. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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claim to the natural law—or as Jefferson termed it, “the Laws of Nature 
and of Nature’s God”—which present truths about the human person 
and human society that are self-evident.11  This is objective reason 
contemplating the common good.  Moreover, this is the nucleus of the 
nature of law!  Through the use of objective reason, the door to truth 
will open, thereby making that which is self-evident accessible to those 
who exercise objective reason.  But how does the person seeking 
objective reason find it?  Is it something attained in law school or the 
elite universities?  Well, it is attainable by anyone who cultivates 
fidelity to the cardinal virtues, for they direct the human person toward 
the life that is concerned about the common good. 
It is through the exercise and application of the cardinal virtues 
(prudence/wisdom, temperance/forbearance, courage, and justice) that 
the human person tempers the will through objective reason.  In short, 
these virtues prevent the person and the societies of persons from 
seeking objectives that are contrary to the natural law and its practical 
objective, the common good.  These virtues are ingrained in many 
people; moreover, they are essential to human societies and their 
success in caring for their members.  Additionally, these virtues 
exercise an important role in the formulation of law, which will be used 
to guide and regulate the society in the endeavors directed toward 
achieving the common good.  As the virtues build the character of the 
human person, the persons thus affected will be much more inclined to 
consider not only self-interest but also the interests of one’s fellow 
human beings.  The virtues prepare the human person to be both good 
citizen and good neighbor who sees the society in which he or she lives 
as the place where the common good can become a reality.  This is why 
the Declaration of Independence asserts that prudence is the mechanism 
to regulate inclinations; however, the human will—the desire—can 
often be strong but is not tethered to the objective reason of prudence 
and wisdom.12  It is this objective reason that is the key to preventing 
governments and their laws from becoming despotic so that “the Laws 
of Nature and of Nature’s God” are not compromised.  In order to avoid 
this compromise, Jefferson penned that the “Supreme Judge of the 
world” was the appeal to which objective reason would be made and 
heard.13  By way of relevant digression, we do not hear very often such 
words today. 
 
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1–2 (U.S. 1776). 
12. As the Declaration states, “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long 
established should not be changed for light and transient causes.”  Id. 
13. Id. at para. 6. 
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The Declaration and the Constitution recognize the importance and 
the role of the law and the rule of law.  In their respective fashions, 
these texts disclose something about the law’s nature by considering the 
purposes for which the laws generated by right and objective reason and 
promulgated by the lawful human authority are ordained.  One of these 
goals is to restrain the will that is misled by an appetite that puts aside 
objective reason.  Another is to promote the common good as the 
Preamble of the Constitution declares.14  Now the skeptic may conclude 
that what I have just stated is not only a lofty goal, but an unrealistic 
one as well.  To justify this position, the skeptic may adduce that the 
human person is an imperfect being living in an imperfect world that is 
characterized by imperfect institutions.  While the skeptic may correctly 
acknowledge the existence of human imperfection, which I do not 
contest, I add that the human person and human institutions can move 
toward improvement, a movement directed by human intelligence and 
virtuous conduct. 
The foundation of this response to the skeptic is established upon the 
presumption that the human person is intelligent.  While everyone has 
different measures of intelligence, the hallmark of the human being is 
that he or she possesses and uses this aptitude.  In addition, most 
everyone has the capacity to distinguish between what the “is” is and 
what could make the “is” better.  This is the distinction between being 
and oughtness made by Heinrich Rommen.15  Put simply, this is the 
distinction between the “is” and the “ought.”  But the distinction does 
not end here because the question must be asked: how does one know 
that there is something that is the “is” from something that is the 
“ought”? 
Understanding what something is—what it is about, if you will—is 
crucial to virtually any human endeavor including the law.  If I need to 
make a small repair to replace a screw on my eyeglasses, I look for a 
small screwdriver rather than a hammer.  Upon thinking about what 
needs to be done, I recall that there is a tool designed for this very 
function.  While I acknowledge that there are many tools that are useful 
to human activities, the screwdriver, because of what it is, is the 
instrument that will properly assist me.  Its essence or nature is 
something that I comprehend, and the tool’s essence enters the choice I 
 
14. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“[T]o form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure 
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common [defense], promote the general Welfare, and secure 
the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . . .”). 
15. See ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 161–62 (“[E]very attempt to establish 
the natural law must start from the fundamental relation of being and oughtness, of the real and 
the good.”). 
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make in selecting the instrument to assist me in completing my project. 
However, as I survey the other projects that I need to tackle, I might 
consider whether the screwdriver of any size or type (e.g., Philips, 
flathead, etc.) is the tool I need.  I may reach the conclusion that the 
work now facing me requires a different tool because I realize that the 
screwdriver is unsuitable for the new work that is ahead of me.  I 
consider the other tools that are available, but I conclude, because of my 
thinking about what needs to be done, that those tools in my tool chest 
are unsuitable for the task.  I realize that there ought to be a tool which 
is suitable, and I realize that my neighbor has such a device which I 
borrow.  This consideration of the “is” and the “ought” enable me to 
conclude the ontology of the tools that are available.  This 
understanding of ontology or essence/nature, further provides the 
catalyst for concluding that for some future work, I may have to develop 
a new tool that is fitting to the undertaking ahead of me. 
This scenario has applicability to the nature of the law.  Through 
critical thinking that is an element of human intelligence, I come to see 
that there is an essence or nature of the things that surround human 
existence.  I further realize that other people have the same or similar 
capacity to reach analogous conclusions.  This is possible because in 
these circumstances the person, regardless of who he or she is, can think 
about what needs to be done and extends this thought process beyond 
what is immediately within his or her thoughts.  In other words, the 
person goes beyond the knowledge of the personal self and thinks more 
deeply and more objectively about the matter under contemplation.  The 
appeal of self-interest so attractive to most persons begins to diminish, 
and it is objective human intelligence that enables the person to see this.  
In short, the objective thought process enables the individual to reach 
some truth about the essence of thing and its being and determines 
whether it will satisfy the need which presents itself or if something else 
must be pursued to fulfill the need. 
As human intelligence has the capacity for understanding what 
something is and what something is not, this intelligence possesses the 
additional aptitude for determining if the object under study lacks 
something essential to its nature and objective.  We therefore know 
what must or ought to be done in order to remedy any deficiency which 
may exist.  Thus, we can also make the is/ought distinction regarding 
the precepts of law.  If this perspective seems plausible, we have the 
capacity to see what the law is and what it is not.  If the law fails to 
meet reasonable expectations, we may well see the course needed to 
remedy this deficiency as well. 
On many occasions, our rational nature may acknowledge that the 
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law fulfills its objectives satisfactorily.  However, there may be 
occasions when we know that the law, or an element of it, is insufficient 
for the task; moreover, our intelligence may demonstrate that the law as 
it “is” is ill-suited for the circumstance to which it is being applied.  In 
this kind of circumstance, we can further recognize that the law ought to 
be doing something that it is not.  In other instances, we may see that it 
is being expected to do something beyond its competence.  The human 
person has the capacity to know and accept these conclusions insofar as 
the person’s nature is characterized by reason which comprehends that 
there is a final cause—goal—of the law which is not only not being 
achieved but also is being frustrated because of the law itself.  These 
points are essential to the good governance of human society. 
A longstanding principle of good government and good governance 
is the notion of subsidiarity.  Subsidiarity is the name given to the 
concept that decisions—which would include the need for and the 
making of new norms—should be made at the level where they will be 
applied.  This concept is experienced by most people in their formative 
years in the context of family life where the human person first 
experiences norms and law.  Here we see parental intelligence 
comprehending the intelligible reality of their family circumstances and 
developing norms internal for the prudent regulation and direction of 
family life.  Immediately beyond the nuclear family, we see the same 
principle at work in the village, town, or city.  Once again, the 
intelligence of office holder and citizen combine for discussion and 
debate that generate the norms by which this local community will 
conduct its interpersonal relations.  In a similar fashion, albeit more 
cumbersome because of the magnitude of the territory, the same process 
occurs at the regional (i.e., state) and national levels. 
However, here we begin to see a growing rift between the citizen and 
the office holder.  Some of the rift is attributable to the multitude of 
citizens and the capacity or incapacity of the office holder to engage in 
personal discussion with the citizen.  But another element of the rupture 
is due to the fragmentation of the society and what I will call the 
professionalization of the office holder.  By the professionalization of 
the office holder I mean that he or she is viewed as the expert not only 
in the making of law and its administration, but also in the sense of 
being more capable of deciding what the members of society need and 
what they do not. 
As the important collaborative nature of the bond between citizen and 
office holder becomes less evident under these circumstances, the 
balance between the intellect and the will is altered.  It may be that there 
is still a relation between the intellect and the will; however, the 
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composition of who supplies the intellect and the will has changed.  A 
part of this change is attributable to the sizes of the population and the 
territory over which the law will apply.  But a part of this 
transformation is also attributable to the self-perception that the office 
holder knows better than the citizen who is then consigned to the 
restricted status of the governed.  While the wills of citizens are varied, 
can the same be said of the office holder?  My point here is that the 
office holders will generally have a different set of objectives 
constituting their will than those of the citizens: the prime one would be 
staying in office.  This is a concern for, but probably not an objective of, 
the citizen who is interested in societal improvement.  Although the 
office holder likely has some concern about the welfare of the governed, 
the official can easily have a different take on the moral concerns of the 
law than would those whose lives are guided and regulated by the laws 
which are made. 
Of course, both citizens and office holders can be divided by 
disagreement concerning the objectives of the law.  However, the 
citizens will usually experience the law’s impact more quickly than the 
office holders who may well excuse themselves from the law’s ambit.  
If you doubt my contention, you might inventory the laws made by 
Congress in which it often excuses itself from the law’s application.16  
Some citizens may well get what they want in a newly enacted law, but 
other citizens will probably not be so fortunate—probably because their 
lobbying efforts were less effective.  However, the office holder who 
makes the law has the final say in crafting the language that will 
become the norm.  This is where the distinction between the “is” and 
the “ought” of the law becomes all the more important. 
Whatever laws are made, their content is the law’s being; the content 
becomes the “is.”  But there would be little guarantee that the laws that 
are promulgated are what is needed by the society for its general 
welfare, its domestic tranquility, its mutual defense, and its enjoyment 
of true justice.  If I may borrow from Thomas Aquinas’s first principle 
of the law (seeking the good and avoiding the evil)17 and ask a question: 
has the pursuit of doing what is essential for the common good been 
compromised by the accommodation of special interests?  If this is the 
case, the balance between the discerning and objective intellect and the 
satisfaction of a proper will has been disturbed.  If I may borrow again 
 
16. See, e.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and Popular Distrust: The 
Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State Constitutional Amendment by Initiative 
Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 3, 18 n.55 (1992) (including a catalogue of self-granted 
Congressional exemptions). 
17. AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2, at 221–22. 
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from my fellow Jesuit Viktor Cathrein, the natural moral law (which he 
defines as “the light of reason inherent in us by nature, through which 
we perceive what we ought to do and avoid”18) has been discounted.  It 
may also be that the process of defining the ought has been transformed 
insofar as determining what ought to be done now takes more stock of 
self-preservation than attainment of the common good. 
What is the response to this predicament regarding the “ought”?  In 
the final analysis, the “ought” offers a path to securing the common 
good.  Here I must emphasize the role of the “moral” in the concept of 
the natural moral law since what is moral pertains to the common good.  
What is moral and what is not must acknowledge the importance and 
the primacy of the common good.  Both the intellect and the will have 
crucial roles to play in its attainment.  The intellect by speculative 
reason can identify and weigh the merits or lack thereof of the content 
of the norms to be promulgated that advance the common good.  The 
intellect is the means of evaluating the “is” and the “ought.”  The will, 
on the other hand, exercises the determination to ensure that what has 
been defined by the superior intellect as the “ought” will be attained.  
To assist this important project, which is vital to the project of 
democracy, is, as Heinrich Rommen explained it, the identification of 
material content of the human (positive) law that will advance the 
common good from the “rational, free, and social” nature of man.19 
This human or positive law should to be the product of the natural 
law if the primacy of the common good is to be respected and protected.  
Without this lifeline, the law will be whatever the law-maker wants, and 
as history has amply demonstrated, this can be most problematic.  The 
nobility of the law is put into serious risk if it is the product of 
positivism where the will escapes from its vital link to the intellect and 
makes whatever law the law-maker wants without any further 
consideration of the moral concerns of the law-making enterprise.  
Despotic forms of governance throughout much of recent human history 
have justified their reigns not solely by brute force, but by brute force 
that is justified by the law of positivism.  As Rommen reminds us in his 
monumental work on the nature of the state, the dictators of the modern 
age were “masters of legality” and used the law, as Hitler did, to come 
to power by the democratic process of majority vote.20  The antidote to 
this inevitably disastrous approach has its source in the Book of 
 
18. See ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 181–82 (quoting VIKTOR CATHERIN, 
S.J., 2 MORALPHILOSOPHIE 344 (4th ed. 1904)). 
19. Id. at 186. 
20. HEINRICH ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 212–13 (1945) [hereinafter 
ROMMEN, CATHOLIC THOUGHT]. 
THE NATURE OF THE LAW.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/29/2013  7:45 PM 
2013] The Nature of the Law and the Role of Citizenship 299 
Wisdom: love justice, you who are rulers of the earth.21  But how does 
one know what justice is? 
Once again, the combination of the intellect and the will supply an 
answer which resides in the nature of the human person who is both 
intelligent and virtuous.  If the intellect and the will are the common 
heritage of the members of the human family, so is virtue.  The 
elements of virtue, particularly the cardinal virtues (courage, justice, 
forbearance/temperance, and prudence/wisdom), are the building blocks 
upon which the objective intellect and the healthy will are established 
and exercised.  It is this human edifice where the natural moral law 
claims its home: the human person whose will and intellect founded 
upon virtue will make norms that are just, prudent and wise, temperate, 
and courageous because this person’s existence is established on these 
qualities. 
 
II.  
This brings me to the sub-heading of today’s lecture: the role of 
citizenship in defining the nature of the law.  Some may think of the law 
as commands; others may think of the law as duties; still others may 
think it a body of rights and protections to these claims.  But the law’s 
final cause or objective is the means by which people justly live their 
individual lives in common with their neighbors, whoever they may be.  
The essence of the law is geared to right relationship in this common 
life, and this truth about the law introduces the essential subject of 
citizenship.  Liberty that is ordered by the law is the fashion in which it 
is embraced by the citizen and office holder alike, for both know what 
the law is and also what it ought to be when the common good is at 
stake.  Each member of these two classes inhabits the res publica and 
shares the common denominator as a member of the society.  It is their 
common rational being that helps them sort out what is essential to 
ordering human liberty by means of the law.  In the final analysis, 
Rommen’s definition of the law is appropriate here: the law is a 
“general rule of reason which is directed to the common good, emanates 
from public authority, and is duly promulgated.”22  It takes an authentic 
freedom to recognize this, and each person by his or her reason can 
comprehend the distinction between the authentic freedom that is 
essential to the law and unrestrained license. 
In the context of Rommen’s definition of the law, attention needs to 
be placed on the public authority for this is the intersection of the 
 
21. Wisdom 1:1–3. 
22. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 195. 
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responsibilities of the citizen and of the office holder.  In our federal 
republic, the office holder comes from the citizenry; moreover, the 
office holder exercises a trust on behalf of the citizenry.  It is the 
prudence/wisdom, courage, temperance/forbearance, and justice of the 
citizen and the office holder who, by the exercise of the intellect and 
reason, can see that the law is the means by which the common good is 
achieved and sustained.  If the law is an act of reason, it is right reason 
that is formed by the virtues that make any person—as citizen or as 
office holder—recognize that the law is, first and last, the means by 
which the common good is the objective of the just society.  The law 
will ultimately fail if it is about preserving the position of a particular 
person or group; however, it will succeed if it is directed to achieving 
the common good which takes into account the life, liberty, and pursuit 
of happiness of everyone.  As Thomas Aquinas reminds us, it is this 
pursuit of what is good, what is just that “directs man in his relations” 
with others.23 
For the citizen who may become office holder and who then has a 
particular role in the formulation of the human law, the ability to know 
what is good and what is just is dependent on his or her intellectual and 
moral formation.  An essential part of this formation is to understand 
that the human person lives in relationship with everyone else.  This 
element of authentic human formation, moreover, alerts each person to 
the fact that while he or she has rights (rights that emerge not from the 
state but from their innate and inviolable dignity as a human being), 
everyone, by the exercise of objective reason, must simultaneously 
acknowledge that everyone else must have the same capacity to the 
same or similar claims.  In short, this critical formation pairs right with 
responsibility. 
It is the practice of virtue that enables the person to understand and 
acknowledge the synthesis of right and responsibility in one’s personal 
life as it is lived in community—in relation—with others.  This point is 
the foundation of what can be termed the essential element of justice 
that is founded on the natural moral law: the suum cuique, to each his or 
her own.  Of course, what is due each member of the human family 
cannot be fully and finally determined until the due of others with 
whom this person is in relation is considered.  With recognition of the 
suum cuique comes the application of norms that are conscious of the 
twinning of right and responsibility.  The virtuous person has the 
capacity to know this by the exercise of courage, prudence/wisdom, 
 
23. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON LAW & JUSTICE: EXCERPTS FROM SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. II-
II, q. 58, art. 5, at 1437–38 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds., 1988). 
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justice, and forbearance/temperance.  No one can properly claim a right 
without acknowledging the responsibilities that attend the right. 
It has been said that virtue directs the acts of the human person 
toward the common good.24  With the virtuous person directing the 
formulation and application of the human law, the natural moral law is 
observed.  It has been said that an evil law is no law at all.25  One need 
not think too long or hard to realize the truth of this claim.  Surely in 
recent times, the despotic, totalitarian states of the world have brought 
hardship, suffering, and annihilation to tens of millions of human 
subjects.  Therefore it is crucial to remember that for the most part these 
states did what they did not in the absence of law but with its evil 
surrogate in the form of a destructive positivist law.  These were legal 
systems with laws based not on objective reason and moral 
consideration but, rather, on an intensified will that takes account of the 
interests of the controlling party (e.g., National Socialist, Communist, 
Fascist) and little or nothing else. 
The natural moral law is founded on the premise of the common 
good.  The positivist law is founded on other suppositions, which find a 
home in Supreme Court decisions such as Dred Scott v. Sanford26 and 
Buck v. Bell.27  I hasten to add that this is not a comprehensive but only 
illustrative list.  Positivist law can also be found in legislation such as 
those examples already mentioned, e.g., the Fugitive Slave Act and the 
Nuremberg Laws.  To recall the Hart and Fuller engagement of the 
1950s and 1960s (their debating whether there is a separation between 
law and morality),28 the virtuous person recognizes that the law, when 
true to its vocation, is a moral enterprise.  As Rommen contended, “law 
and morality are not separated.”29  While some laws may be facially 
neutral regarding moral concerns, (for example: making a law to 
regulate on which side of the street motorists drive), there is often a 
 
24. JEAN-YVES CALVES & JAQUES PERRIN, THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL 
TEACHINGS OF THE POPES FROM LEO XIII TO PIUS XII 148 (J.R. Kirwan trans., 1961) (referring 
to a letter from Cardinal Gasparri, the Secretary of State, to M. Duthoit, the President of the 
Semaines Sociales in 1928). 
25. AQUINAS, supra note 5, pt. I-II, q. 96, art. 4, at 233. 
26. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV. 
27. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
28. Compare H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593 (1958) (defending the Positivist school of jurisprudence), with Lon L. Fuller, Positivism 
and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) (criticizing 
Professor Hart’s thesis as essentially incomplete, in part, because it ignores the internal “morality 
of order” that is necessary to create law). 
29. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW, supra note 6, at 212. 
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moral concern originating within their underlying intent (e.g., regulating 
motorist conduct in order to protect them, their passengers, and other 
users of public ways).  With the exception of private bills that become 
law through the legislative process, virtually all law that is legislated is 
done so for reasons that have some grounding in moral implications. 
Thus, laws made by human institutions, which ignore or contradict 
moral considerations are suspect.  Laws that are immoral are all the 
more dubious.  For law to be legitimate it must be directed to the 
common good; thus, it requires a moral foundation.30  If the task of the 
law, then, is to combat or at least avoid that which is evil in society and 
to seek and preserve that which is good (specifically the common good), 
there is a need for the freedom for the citizenry and the public officials 
to recognize and do what is necessary to secure this objective.  This 
freedom is not a negative one, i.e., freedom from; rather, it is a positive 
freedom for.  But some exercises of freedom can have an imbalanced 
appetite that directs disproportional energy to acquiring or achieving 
objectives that are incompatible with the common good.  Moreover, 
some notions of freedom and liberty are problematic as they can set the 
claims of individuals in diametrical opposition to one another.  One 
major illustration of this is the dicta from Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
in which the plurality opinion asserts that, “At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”31  This is not a 
recommended method for achieving the common good through the 
juridical mechanisms of society; rather it is a recipe for anarchy.  While 
their objective was likely something else, the Supreme Court plurality 
did not recognize that this formulation sets conflicting views of liberty 
on a collision course without providing a means for preventing the 
confrontation.  However, the natural moral law proposes a different 
course. 
With the foreknowledge that the law is a moral enterprise, the natural 
moral law acknowledges the importance and vitality of liberty; 
however, it also recognizes that liberty, if it is true to its vocation, must 
be ordered by always taking account of liberty’s complementary 
responsibilities.  And the likely agent for fashioning the order of liberty 
is the natural moral law and its objective of achieving and sustaining the 
common good.  When the law is true to its nature, it has the capacity to 
order properly the liberty of persons, not to curtail a natural right which 
they have, but to ensure that it remains authentic and robust for all 
 
30. Id. at 213 (“All law requires a moral foundation.”). 
31. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
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rather than some members of society.  The nature of the law, as I have 
explained it, has the antidote and counterpoint to the fallacy about 
liberty presented by the dicta of Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
It is this nature of the law that ensures the freedoms we all desire are 
sought by a properly formed will.  This regulatory and protective 
function of the nature of the law is an exercise of the objective reason 
upon which the human intellect relies.  This reliance, furthermore, 
accentuates human consciousness and the rational process so that the 
claiming of rights for me is never divorced from simultaneous 
responsibilities to thee.  Resident within these processes, then, is the 
guarantor that the common good will not be undermined but will be 
promoted and protected. 
As I have reminded past audiences in this lecture series,32 we are all 
citizens of two cities: the City of God and the City of Man.  Today I 
concentrate on the second citizenship just mentioned.  For within this 
citizenship—which is a natural right—there is also a natural duty.  This 
natural duty contains the obligation to ensure that the law seeks the 
common good rather than iniquity.  The citizens of the City of Man are 
not inert bystanders who must remain by the sidelines when the office 
holder takes the law into the direction of positivism and away from the 
common good that is built on the natural moral law.  The citizens are 
and must remain active participants in securing the common good as 
their authentic individual good is inextricably related and 
complementary to the common good.  Here we are reminded of an 
important thought often attributed to Edmund Burke: “All that is 
necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”33 
Regardless of the source of this counsel, its posture and substantive 
content ring true.  Democracy and the rule of law that undergirds it are 
not easy tasks to build and sustain; they are hard work and require the 
participation of people of good will who know and exercise their rights 
and responsibilities in a manner that reinforces the quest for the 
common good.  That is why the citizens interested in the existence and 
support of democracy and the rule of law realize that they must make 
their own contribution to the law’s sustenance.  To follow the Burkean 
admonition, they must do something so that evil will not triumph.  In a 
 
32.  See, e.g., Robert John Araujo, S.J., Inaugural Lecture of the John Courtney Murray Chair: 
John Courtney Murray S.J.: A Citizen of Two Cities (April 27, 2010), in 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. i, ii 
(2010). 
33. See EDMUND BURKE, THOUGHTS ON THE CAUSE OF PRESENT DISCONTENTS (1770), 
reprinted in 1 SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 69, 146 (Liberty Fund ed., 1999) (“When bad 
men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a 
contemptible struggle.”). 
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similar fashion, we must consider why doing something is critical to the 
law and its nature and the common good that they support.  Heinrich 
Rommen’s fellow German, the Lutheran pastor Martin Niemöller, 
supplies further thought on this.  Like Rommen, he was arrested by the 
Nazis but also escaped execution.  After the Second World War, 
Niemöller would often discuss what happened in his beloved Germany 
by saying that: the Nazis first came for the socialists and communists, 
but he did not speak out because he was not one of them; then they 
came for the trade unionists and the Jews, but again he did nothing 
because he was neither of them; finally, when they came for him, “no 
one was left to speak for me.”34  As I have stated, democracy, the rule 
of law, and sustaining the nature of the law involve commitment, 
diligence, and effort.  If nothing is done, as Pastor Niemöller asserted, 
the darkness that can envelope the world will prevail—at least for a 
while.  And during that time, much that is good (including the common 
good) can be lost. 
With conscious and concerted effort by the virtuous person and 
citizen, what is at stake, i.e., the common good, will not be forgotten or 
compromised.  The virtuous citizen, like the virtuous office holder 
(would that we have more!), possesses the capacity to exercise the 
freedom needed to memorialize and practice what is essential to the 
law’s nature.  It is the law’s nature that directs the society where this 
nature’s authenticity is cherished by sustaining the environment for 
seeking and keeping the common good.  Each person possesses an 
inclination toward the common good.  This precious disposition can be 
compromised, but it cannot be removed from the objective reason of the 
person by the state even though its practice can be inhibited by the state.  
So, the virtuous citizen ought not to neglect the freedom to do what is 
necessary for the common good.  Freedom that is pursued for whatever 
the individual self desires is an exercise of the will detached from the 
intellect.  Moreover, it is a liberty that is disordered rather than ordered.  
And when disordered liberty is at bay, we will come to know their 
distortion of freedom by another of its names: chaos. 
Let us not forget, then, that it is the nature of the law to see that this 
disarray remains at bay!  We can do something in this regard if we are 
true to the vocation of virtuous citizenship by nurturing a society whose 
lodestar is the natural moral law. 
 
34. See Harold Marcuse, Martin Niemöller’s Famous Quotation: “First They Came for the 
Communists . . .”, U. CAL., SANTA BARBARA, DEPARTMENT HIST. (Feb. 28, 2013), 
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/niem.htm (explaining the Martin Neimöller position 
regarding the piecemeal erosion of the prerogatives of citizens by the National Socialist Party). 
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Thank you very much! 
 
